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INTRODUCTION

Throughout the past few decades, federal courts have carved out

some limited exceptions to the traditional maxim ignorantialegis non
excusat' in the context of criminal prosecutions Until recently, the
courts have generally refused to apply such exceptions to administra-

tive actions for violations of the securities laws. Two recent decisions
from the D.C. and Seventh Circuit Courts of Appeals, however, suggest that ignorance of the law may be emerging as a defense to certain
types of administrative violations of the federal securities laws as well.'
Howard v SEC' and Monetta FinancialServices v SEC' both va-

cated administrative penalties that the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) had imposed against high-ranking employees for
aiding and abetting their respective employers' violations of the secut
1

B.A. 2004, Stanford University; J.D. Candidate 2007, University of Chicago.
Literally: "ignorance of the law does not excuse." Sharon L. Davies, The Jurisprudenceof

Willfulness:An Evolving Theory of Excusable Ignorance,48 Duke L J 341,342 (1998).

See generally id (urging judicial enforcement of the maxim absent clear contrary signals
2
in text or legislative intent).
3 See, for example, Wonsover v SEC, 205 F3d 408, 414 (DC Cir 2000) ("[Willfulness]
means no more than that the person ... knows what he is doing. It does not mean that ... he must

suppose that he is breaking the law."), quoting Hughes v SEC, 174 F2d 969,977 (DC Cir 1949). See
also Tager v SEC, 344 F2d 5, 8 (2d Cir 1965) ("There is no requirement that the actor also be
aware that he is violating one of the Rules or Acts.").
4 Although there are both federal and state securities laws (the latter are commonly referred to as "blue sky laws," see Jonathan R. Macey and Geoffrey P. Miller, Origin of the Blue
Sky Laws, 70 Tex L Rev 347, 359 n 59 (1991)), this Comment is concerned exclusively with the
former and generally refers to the federal securities laws as simply the "securities laws."
5 376 F3d 1136 (DC Cir 2004).
6
390 F3d 952 (7th Cir 2004).
7
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act), 15 USC § 78o(b)(4) (2000 & Supp
2002), provides that the SEC can censure, limit, suspend, or deregister any broker-dealer who has
"willfully aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, or procured the violation by any other
person of" the securities laws.
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rities laws.8 Both Howard and Monetta appear to hold that a respon-

dent9 cannot be liable for aiding and abetting unless he was aware of
the illegality of his actions.' Subsequent commentary regarding these
decisions has tended to focus on the issue of whether recklessness can
satisfy the scienter element of securities fraud," which is defined by
the Supreme Court as "a mental state embracing intent to deceive,
manipulate, or defraud.' 2 Few have noted that both holdings appear
to have created a mistake of law defense by requiring knowledge of
an act's illegality'-a departure from the traditional rule that ignorance of the law is no excuse.
Nor does there appear to be any published commentary noting
that Howard and Monetta are at odds with a wide body of precedent
regarding intentional violations of the securities laws. The Second Cir-

cuit has expressly rejected a mistake of law defense under the same
enforcement provision at issue in Howard and Monetta." There is also
significant intracircuit tension: the D.C. Circuit has rejected a mistake
of law defense for primary violators of the securities laws, based on
almost identical language in a subsection neighboring the one dealing
with aiders and abettors (or "secondary violators"). But the D.C. Circuit in Howard and the Seventh Circuit in Monetta fail to discuss any
of this conflicting authority.
This Comment will attempt to resolve both the intercircuit split
and intracircuit tension regarding whether ignorance of the law is a
Howard,376 F3d at 1150; Monetta, 390 F3d at 958.
9 The person accused of the violation is referred to as a "defendant" in civil enforcement
actions and as a "respondent" in administrative actions. The distinction between the two types of
actions is discussed in Part II.A.
10 See Howard, 376 F3d at 1143 ("In short, the evidence showed that Howard was not
aware, generally or otherwise, of any wrongdoing."); Monetta, 390 F3d at 956 ("The SEC has not
provided any evidence suggesting that [the respondent] was, in fact, aware that disclosure of the
IPO allocations was required.").
11 See, for example, Jay K. Musoff and Adam S. Zimmerman, D.C Circuit Wrestles with Intent
in Securities Fraud, Nati L J S4, S4 (Dec 13, 2004) (noting only that "the circuits have split over
whether reckless behavior still satisfies the substantive scienter requirement for securities fraud").
12 Aaron v SEC, 446 US 680,686 n 5 (1980) (reserving the question "whether, under some
circumstances, scienter may also include reckless behavior").
13 Although a number of commentators have argued for a distinction between "ignorance
of the law" and "mistake of law," any such distinction would bear on the precise question of how
knowledge of the law is relevant to liability, not the general question of whether it is relevant at
all. Accordingly, this Comment will follow the common practice of using the two terms interchangeably. Consider Davies, 48 Duke L J at 344 n 9 (cited in note 1) (acknowledging that "ignorance" and "mistake" are distinct concepts but "adopt[ing] the practice of those who use the
terms interchangeably"); Edwin R. Keedy, Ignorance and Mistake in the CriminalLaw, 22 Harv
L Rev 75, 76 (1908) (noting that the "terms have generally been used interchangeably," though
they "convey different ideas").
14 See Arthur Lipper Corp v SEC, 547 F2d 171,180 (2d Cir 1976) ("There is no requirement that the actor [ ]be aware that he is violating one of the Rules or Acts.").
8
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defense to administrative aiding and abetting liability. Part I describes
the historical rule that ignorance of the law is not an excuse and the
traditional exceptions to the rule. Part II describes various forms of
SEC enforcement actions, discusses how the rule has been applied in
SEC administrative enforcement proceedings, and explains the circuit
split. Part III evaluates and rejects the arguments in favor of creating a
general mistake of law defense specifically for administrative aiding
and abetting liability. Part IV offers a coherent and tenable alternative
rule, under which ignorance of the law is a limited defense that is relevant only to the extent that it negates the scienter required for both
primary and secondary violations of the securities laws. Part V concludes that this rule is generally consistent with judicial practice, but
needs to be expressly articulated in order to avoid erroneously creating different standards of intent for aiding and abetting liability and
primary liability.
I. IGNORANCE OF THE LAW GENERALLY

This Part will describe the history of the rule that ignorance of
the law is not a defense, noting the two traditional exceptions: when
provided for by statute or when ignorance of the law negates an intent
element of the crime. This Part will also discuss how the rule has retained its validity over time, subject occasionally to a modem exception based on the word "willfully."
Origins of the Rule

A.

The maxim ignorantialegis non excusat5 has a venerable pedigree
and a long history of academic attention. The rule can be found in
English decisions as far back as 1231,7 and was apparently adapted
from Roman law." Blackstone described the rule as follows:
[I]gnorance or mistake is another defect of will; when a man, intending to do a lawful act, does that which is unlawful. For here

15

The maxim has a number of Latin variants. See, for example, Keedy, 22 Harv L Rev at 76

& n 1 (cited in note 13) (rendering the maxim as "[i]gnorantiajuris non excusat, ignorantiafacti

excusat" and listing other versions).
16 See generally, for example, id. See also Jerome Hall, Ignorance and Mistake in Criminal
Law, 33 Ind L J 1 (1957) (analyzing ignorance and mistake of both fact and law in light of the
principle of legality, mens rea, and an imperfect criminal justice system); Livingston Hall and
Selig J. Seligman, Mistake of Law and Mens Rea, 8 U Chi L Rev 641 (1941) (tracing the maxim's
history and justifications and describing traditional exceptions); Rollin M. Perkins, Ignoranceand
Mistake in CriminalLaw, 88 U Pa L Rev 35 (1939).

See Keedy, 22 Harv L Rev at 78-81 (cited in note 13).
See id at 80-81 (noting that under Roman law, ignorance of the law as a defense applied
only to certain classes, such as "peasants and other persons of small intelligence").
17
18
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the deed and the will acting separately, there is not that conjunction between them, which is necessary to form a criminal act. But
this must be an ignorance or mistake of fact, and not an error in
point of law... For a mistake in point of law, which every person
of discretion not only may, but is bound and presumed to know, is
in criminal cases no sort of defence."
The rule's primary historical justification was that the law is certain and knowable, and therefore anyone of sound mind can rightly be
expected to obey its precepts.0 The modern justification, set out by
Justice Holmes, is pragmatic: "[T]o admit the excuse at all would be to
encourage ignorance where the law-maker has determined to make
men know and obey, and justice to the individual is rightly outweighed
by the larger interests on the other side of the scales."2
B.

Exceptions
Whatever the justification, the Supreme Court has repeatedly

noted the traditional rule that ignorance of the law is no excuse -even

when creating exceptions to it.2 As a result, though the rule itself does
not appear to be in any danger of extinction, the exceptions are also
quite relevant.
There are two traditional exceptions to this rule, and the Model

Penal Code (MPC) contains both of them. According to the MPC,
ignorance of the law does excuse when it either (1) negates an element of the offense, or (2) is specifically established as a defense by
statute.3 The first "exception," however, may arguably be thought of as
limiting the scope of the maxim to pure questions of law, as opposed
to mixed questions of law and fact. 2 If, for example, someone takes or
19 William Blackstone, 4 Commentaries on the Laws of England *27 (Chicago 1979).
20
See Keedy, 22 Harv L Rev at 78-81 (cited in note 13) (citing Sir Matthew Hale's proposition that everyone "of the age of discretion and compos mentis" is presumed to know the law).
21
Hall and Seligman, 8 U Chi L Rev at 648 (cited in note 16), quoting O.W. Holmes, Jr.,
The Common Law 48 (Little, Brown 1881). See also generally Richard S. Murphy and Erin A.
O'Hara, Mistake of Federal Criminal Law: A Study of Coalitions and Costly Information, 5 S Ct
Econ Rev 217 (1997) (advancing an economic model based on information costs that explains
the exceptions to the general rule that ignorance of the law is no excuse).
22
See, for example, Bryan v United States, 524 US 184, 196 (1998) (noting "the traditional
rule that ignorance of the law is no excuse") (internal quotation marks omitted); Ratzlaf v
United States, 510 US 135, 149 (1994) (calling the principle "venerable"); Cheek v United States,
498 US 192, 199 (1991) (noting that "[tihe general rule" is that "ignorance of the law or mistake
of law is no defense to criminal prosecution" and that this principle "is deeply rooted in the
American legal system").
23
See MPC §§ 2.02(9),2.04(1)-(2) (ALI 1962).
24
One example of a mixed question of law and fact that allows an ignorance of the law
defense arises when a tenant damaged flooring he had installed in his landlord's unit in violation
of a statute that prohibited "damaging any property belonging to another." As a matter of law,
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destroys a piece of property belonging to someone else under the mistaken belief that the property actually belongs to her, that mistake is
arguably a factual one regarding the legal status of some physically
existent object, and is therefore not a pure mistake of law defense.n The
second exception is an express mistake of law defense provided by stat-

ute, and courts will generally look for certain words in the statute that
might signal legislative intent to create a mistake of law defense.2 6
In the past few decades, the mistake of law defense has made sig-

nificant inroads in certain areas of federal criminal law, 7 primarily
based on a statutory requirement of "willful" conduct.2 The Supreme
is a word of many meanings, and
Court has remarked that "[w]illful ...

its construction is often influenced by its context." 9 In the context of
criminal cases involving the tax and currency reporting laws, the Court
has "carve[d] out an exception to the traditional rule that ignorance of
the law is no excuse"' on the ground that these statutes were "highly

technical statutes that presented the danger of ensnaring individuals
engaged in apparently innocent conduct."3 Commentators have noted
that the courts have generally been more likely to read "willful" as
allowing a mistake of law defense in criminal contexts where, all

things equal, the statute is complex or risks punishing individuals with
morally blameless motives, or where the term appears with other
mens rea terms, leading courts to try to avoid surplusage.
the flooring belonged to the landlord once installed, but the tenant had a good faith belief that
the property was his own, and the statute required a mental state of intent, knowledge, or recklessness as to whether the property belonged to another. Sanford H. Kadish and Stephen J.
Schulhofer, Criminal Law and Its Processes 261 (Aspen 7th ed 2001), quoting Regina v Smith, 2
QB 354 (1974).
25
See, for example, Morissette v United States, 342 US 246, 270-71 (1952) ("[K]nowing conversion requires more than knowledge that defendant was taking the property ....He must have
had knowledge of the facts, though not necessarily the law, that made the taking a conversion.").
26
See Cheek, 498 US at 200 ("[T]he Court almost 60 years ago interpreted the statutory
term 'willfully' as used in the federal criminal tax statutes as carving out an exception to the
traditional rule.").
27
See Davies, 48 Duke L J at 343-46 (cited in note 1) (listing a number of examples, ranging from criminal prosecutions under "the federal tax provisions" to prosecutions for "knowingly
acquiring or possessing food coupons in a manner not authorized by law").
28
See id at 348 (defining the trend of courts allowing an ignorance of law defense when a
statute requires willful conduct as the "jurisprudence of willfulness").
29
Ratzlaf, 510 US at 141 (quotation marks and original alterations omitted). See also
Cheek, 498 US at 200-01 (holding, in the context of a criminal prosecution for tax evasion, that
the word "willfully" adds knowledge of illegality as an element of a crime).
30
Bryan, 524 US at 195 (internal quotation marks omitted), citing Ratzlaf, 510 US at 149,
and Cheek, 498 US at 200.
31 Bryan, 524 US at 194.
32
See Davies, 48 Duke L J at 362 (cited in note 1) (listing reasons courts construe the term
"willfully" as imposing a requirement of knowledge of the law); Murphy and O'Hara, 5 S Ct
Econ Rev at 277 (cited in note 21) (arguing that ignorance of the law is most often a defense
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The mistake of law defense has not, however, made similar inroads in the securities laws, even with respect to the criminal provisions of the securities laws that require "willful" violations.3 Although
arguably these provisions should be eligible for a mistake of law defense based on the word "willful," a number of circuits have specifically rejected this argument. The Eighth Circuit noted that the Exchange Act expressly allows ignorance of the law as an affirmative
defense to imprisonment;" thus, by negative implication, it reasoned

that ignorance of the law does not apply to any other forms of punishment.3 5 The Ninth Circuit similarly held that the word "willful" did
not create a mistake of law defense to criminal violations of the Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act).36
II.

IGNORANCE OF THE LAW IN

SEC ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS

In 2004, the D.C. and Seventh Circuits produced opinions that
seem to allow a mistake of law defense in a very specific context: noncriminal administrative actions for aiding and abetting violations of
the securities laws. This Part will offer an overview of SEC administrative actions, summarize the case law applying the general rule ignorantia legis non excusat to administrative actions, and then describe the two

recent cases that appear to reject the rule and create a circuit split.
A. "Administrative Actions" Defined
The SEC has the power to bring two distinct types of enforce37
ment actions against a person who has violated the securities laws.3
when the costs of informing the target population of the law are prohibitively high, either because the population is large, the law is complex, or the conduct is not obviously bad).
33 See 15 USC §§ 77x ("willfully violates"), 78ff(a) ("[w]illful violations") (2000 & Supp 2002).
34 See 15 USC § 78ff(a) ("[N]o person shall be subject to imprisonment under this section
for the violation of any rule or regulation if he proves that he had no knowledge of such rule or
regulation.").
35
United States v O'Hagan,139 F3d 641, 647 (8th Cir 1998) (distinguishing imprisonment
from conviction), on remand from 521 US 642 (1997). The Supreme Court also noted this fact,
and said nothing that suggested a contrary reading. See 521 US at 665-66 & nn 12-13 (describing
"two sturdy safeguards Congress has provided regarding scienter": the government must prove
willful violation and, to imprison a defendant, knowledge of the violated rule).
36 United States v English, 92 F3d 909, 914 (9th Cir 1996) (rejecting the argument that
"willful," in the context of a criminal violation of the Securities Act, 15 USC § 77x, "require[d]
proof that the defendant knew that his actions were illegal"). See also Mueller v Sullivan, 141
F3d 1232,1235 (7th Cir 1998) (Easterbrook) (holding that the word "willful" does not necessarily
create a mistake of law defense to criminal violations of a state's securities laws), citing English,
92 F3d at 914-16; Louis Loss and Joel Seligman, Securities Regulation § 12-B-2 (Aspen 3d ed
2004) (noting the possibility that "'willfully' might mean something more in the penal provisions
than in § 15(b)(4) of the Exchange Act").
37
A person in this context can be either a legal entity or a human being. See 15 USC
§ 78c(9) (2000 & Supp 2004).
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First, the SEC can bring a civil enforcement action as a plaintiff in
federal district court. Alternatively, it can bring an administrative enforcement action before an SEC administrative law judge (AU). In
an administrative action, a respondent has a right to appeal the ALJ's
decision to the Commission itself-that is, to the five commissioners
sitting in an adjudicatory role'-and after that may submit a petition
for review to the court of appeals for either the D.C. Circuit or the
circuit in which the respondent resides."° Moreover, as a general matter, administrative actions are only used against entities and individuals who are required to be registered with the SEC in order to conduct
business, and as a result are sometimes referred to as "disciplinary
proceedings.""
The most common administrative action is against brokerdealers 2 under § 15(b) of the Exchange Act." Section 15(b)(4) allows
the SEC to suspend or revoke the registration of a broker-dealer," and
§ 21B allows the SEC to assess monetary penalties and order disgorgement. , These remedies may apply to both primary violators and
secondary violators of the securities laws." Although only the Department of Justice can bring criminal prosecutions, 7 leading commentators have described the SEC's administrative enforcement powers as
,,awesome. ,, '

38
See SEC, The Investor's Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market
Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation, online at http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml
(visited Jan 22,2007).
39
See id. See also Loss and Seligman, Securities Regulation § 8-A-5(a)(iv) (cited in note
36) (discussing how the appeal structure allows the SEC to "litigate in its own forum" and enjoy
deferential review on appeal with respect to its findings of fact and choice of sanction).
40
See Loss and Seligman, Securities Regulation at § 12-C(a)(1) (cited in note 36).
41 See id § at 12-C.
42
"Broker" and "dealer" are catchall terms used to denote securities brokers and dealers,
both of whom are required to register with the SEC. See id at § 1-B-4(b)(i).
43 See id at § 13-C (describing the types of quasi-judicial proceedings under the SEC statutes).
44 See 15 USC § 78o(b)(4) (allowing the SEC, additionally, to censure brokers and "place
limitations on [their] activities, functions, or operations").
45 See 15 USC § 78u-2(a), (e) (2000 & Supp 2002) (giving the SEC authority "to assess
money penalties" and "requir[e] an accounting and disgorgement"). Disgorgement is an equitable remedy that "forc[es] a defendant [or respondent] to give up the amount by which he was
unjustly enriched" through his illegal conduct. SEC v Tome, 833 F2d 1086, 1096 (2d Cir 1987),
quoting SEC v Commonwealth Chemical Securities; Inc, 574 F2d 90,102 (2d Cir 1978).
46 The actual statutory language refers to a person who "has willfully aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, or procured" a "violation by any other person" of the securities laws.
15 USC §§ 78o(b)(4)(E), 78u-2(a)(2).
47
See Loss and Seligman, Securities Regulation at § 1-J-2 (cited in note 36).
48 Id at § 13-D ("It would be hard to think of any further sanction (except perhaps the
return of the whipping post, abolished by Delaware not too many years ago).").
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The General Rule in SEC Administrative Actions:

Ignorance of the Law Is Not a Defense
Although penalties under §§ 15(b) and 21B of the Exchange Act
require "willful[ness], '9 no court has held that the word creates a mistake of law defense under these statutes. In 1965, the D.C. Circuit expressly rejected the argument "that specific intent to violate the law is
an essential element of the willfulness required to violate Section
15(b)" of the Exchange Act.! The court noted that such a "definition
of 'willfully' under Section 15(b) ha[d] been rejected by this court, by
the Second Circuit, and by the Commission."5' Two subsequent decisions from the D.C. and Second Circuits have actually become part of
a boilerplate footnote to the word "willfully" when it first appears in
SEC administrative orders, which reads as follows:"

"Willfully" as used in this Order means intentionally committing
the act which constitutes the violation. See Wonsover v. SEC, 205
E3d 408, 414 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Tager v. SEC, 344 E2d 5, 8 (2d Cir.

1965). There is no requirement that the actor also be aware that
he or she is violating one of the Rules or Acts. 3
Based on this line of decisions rejecting a statutory mistake of
law defense to primary liability Munder § 15(b) of the Exchange Act,
prominent commentators have asserted more generally that in administrative actions, "[t]he SEC is not required to prove that the actor is
also aware that he or she is violating a provision of the federal securities laws."5

See, for example, 15 USC § 78o(b)(4)(E) (prohibiting willful aiding and abetting).
Gearhart& Otis,Inc v SEC,348 F2d 798,802 (DC Cir 1965).
51
Id at 802-03 ("[wle are cited to no case wherein it has been accepted, and we have
found none."). The D.C. Circuit has also held, again in an SEC administrative action (although
not one that required interpretation of the word "willfully"), that, "[e]xcept in very rare instances, no area of the law-not even the criminal law-demands that a defendant have thought
his actions were illegal." SEC v FalstaffBrewing Corp, 629 F2d 62, 77 (DC Cir 1980) (rejecting
the argument "that scienter requires an inquiry into [the defendant's] subjective belief as to the
legality of his action").
52
A LEXIS search of the "SEC Decisions, Orders & Releases" database for "(wonsover
w/s tager) and willful!" yielded 138 hits on January 16,2007.
53 In the Matter of Cemo, 2005 SEC LEXIS 1743, *9 n 1 (2005). See also In the Matter of
OppenheimerFunds Inc,2005 SEC LEXIS 2350, *14 n 4 (2005) (using slightly different language
but making the same point and citing the same cases).
54 Although the decisions being discussed all involve primary liability, none specifically
notes this fact or makes any distinction between primary and secondary liability.
55 Ralph C. Ferrara and Philip S. Khinda, SEC Enforcement Proceedings:Strategic Considerationsfor When the Agency Comes Calling,51 Admin L Rev 1143,1187 (1999), citing Tager,344
F2d at 8. See also Loss and Seligman, Securities Regulation at § 8-A-5 n 134 (cited in note 36)
(discussing at length the various constructions of the term "willfully" in different jurisdictions).
49
50
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Like criminal liability under the securities laws, administrative
aiding and abetting liability requires that a violation be committed
"willfully."56 Given the "normal rule of statutory construction that
identical words used in different parts of the same act are intended to
have the same meaning,"5 one would expect that administrative aiding
and abetting liability, like primary liability under the same provisions,
would lack a mistake of law defense. Indeed, the Second Circuit did
reject ignorance of the law as a defense to administrative aiding and
abetting- holding that, like primary violations, aiding and abetting
"does not require proof of evil motive, or intent to violate the law, or
knowledge that the law was being violated.""
C.

A Possible New Rule: Howard and Monetta

Two cases decided in 2004-one from the D.C. Circuit and one
from the Seventh Circuit -appear to accept ignorance of the law as a
defense, though it is not entirely clear on what grounds they do so.
In Howard, the D.C. Circuit vacated sanctions that the SEC had
imposed against Nicholas P.Howard, an officer of a registered brokerdealer firm, for aiding and abetting securities fraud in the course of
marketing two private placement offerings of common stock. 9 The
broker-dealer firm had illegally bought some of the shares in the first
offering in order to put the total number of purchased shares above
the minimum threshold required to close, thereby making it appear
that there was greater market demand for the shares than actually
existed. Howard, apparently unaware that this maneuver was illegal,
continued to market the shares, helped close the offering, and then
marketed a second offering without disclosing the fact that the first
one had illegally closed. ° The SEC distinguished ignorance of the law
from ignorance of facts, 6' and found that Howard had "full knowledge

15 USC §§ 78o(b)(4)(E),78u-2(e).
Sullivan v Stroop, 496 US 478, 484 (1990) (internal quotations omitted). There is an
exception to this rule when the words appear in different contexts. See GeneralDynamic Land
Systems, Inc v Cline,540 US 581,595 ("The [rule] is not rigid and readily yields whenever there is
such variation in the connection in which the words are used as reasonably to warrant the conclusion that they were employed in different parts of the act with different intent."). However,
there is no such contextual difference in § 15(b)(4). For further discussion on tight contextual
links between the primary and secondary violation statutes, see text accompanying note 86.
58
Arthur Lipper Corp v SEC,547 F2d 171,180 (2d Cir 1976).
59 See 376 F3d at 1138,1140-41 & n 2.
60 See id at 1140-41.
61 See In the Matter of Howard, 2003 SEC LEXIS 377, *15-16 ("Knowledge means awareness of the underlying facts, not the labels that the law places on those facts."), quoting Falstaff,
629 F2d at 77.
56
57
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of the underlying facts."' Accordingly, the SEC found Howard liable
for aiding and abetting his employer's fraud. '
The D.C. Circuit questioned but did not overturn the SEC's legal
conclusions regarding the primary violations by Howard's firm,6 and it
left undisturbed the SEC's findings that Howard had full knowledge
of the facts underlying the primary violations.0 The court did, however,
reverse the SEC's determination that Howard was liable for aiding
and abetting. Since Howard "did not know that his role was part of an
overall activity that was improper,"6 the court held that, "[i]n short,
the evidence showed that Howard was not aware, generally or otherwise, of any wrongdoing. To the extent the SEC explained itself, its
point was the opposite-Howard's fault was in not being aware."67
Nowhere did the Howard court acknowledge the traditional rule that
ignorance of the law is not a defense, or distinguish questions of law
from question of fact as the SEC did in its opinion.A few months after Howard, the Seventh Circuit in Monetta followed the D.C. Circuit and similarly accepted ignorance of the law as

a defense to administrative aiding and abetting liability. In Monetta,
the SEC sanctioned Robert Bacarella, the president of Monetta Financial Services, a registered investment adviser, for violating § 206(2)
of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (Investment Advisers Act) 69
when it allocated shares to some of its own directors without disclos-

ing that fact to its other clients who received shares from the same

62

Id at *16-17.

63

The court observed that the

violation of Rule 10b-9 consisted of improperly closing the initial offering rather than returning the proceeds of the sales to the investors. The violations of Rule 10b-5 were the
failure to disclose in the first offering that these purchases would be counted toward the
minimum and the failure to disclose in the second offering that the first offering had closed
improperly.
Howard, 376 F3d at 1141.
64 The court remarked that although "[n]either Rule 10b-9, nor the SEC's contemporaneous explanation of it, mention sales to insiders or persons affiliated with the offeror or
whether-as occurred here-these sales may be counted toward the minimum," id at 1145, and
that "[w]e do not suggest that the SEC erred in concluding that JCI and New Europe Hotels
violated Rule 10b-9." Id at 1146 n 17.
Id at 1142 ("Howard knew the first offering could not close unless 2,000,000 shares were
65
sold, and [] he knew that [his employer] engaged in efforts to reach that number through transac[He] also knew of the second offering.").
tions which, the SEC charged, violated Rule 10b-9 ....
66 Id (emphasis omitted).
67

Id at 1143.

See Howard,2003 SEC LEXIS 377, *15.
15 USC § 80b-6 (2000) ("It shall be unlawful for any investment adviser ...to engage in
any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates as a fraud or deceit upon any
client or prospective client.").
68
69
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offering. ° The SEC held Bacarella's firm liable for nondisclosure of a
potential conflict of interest." Section 206(2), however, applies only to
registered investment advisors like Bacarella's firm-not to officers like
Bacarella. Thus the SEC held Bacarella individually liable as an aider
and abettor 2 based on the ALI's finding that he had full knowledge of
the facts underlying the primary violation 3 as well as intent to deceive."
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit, like the D.C. Circuit in Howard,accepted the SEC's findings with respect to liability for the primary violations.5 The court also left the SEC's findings of fact undisturbed, with one
exception: it held that "the SEC's finding that Bacarella was aware that
disclosure was required" was unsupported by substantial evidence. 6 On
this basis the court also vacated the SEC's legal conclusion that Bacarella was liable for aiding and abetting his firm's violation."
Citing Howard, the court reasoned that "[n]o rules expressly required disclosure of the IPO allocations," and that, "[m]oreover, the
SEC did not find that [the firm] allocated the shares inequitably-the
presence of inequitable allocations surely should have alerted Bacarella to the fact that disclosure, at the very least, was required."78 In
See Monetta, 390 F3d at 953-54.
In the Matter of Monetta Financial Services, Inc, 2003 SEC LEXIS 1377, *30-31 (concluding that "[Monetta Financial Services], acting through Bacarella, willfully violated, and Bacarella willfully aided and abetted and was a cause of MFS' violations of [Investment] Advisers
Act § 206(2)"). Note that § 206(2), unlike § 10(b), can be violated even without scienter. See
Aaron v SEC, 446 US 680,696-97 (1980) (noting that § 10(b) "embraces a scienter requirement,"
while citing SEC v CapitalGains Research Bureau, Inc, 375 US 180,200 (1963), for the proposition that § 206(2) of the Investment Advisers Act does not require scienter).
72 Monetta, 2003 SEC LEXIS 1377 at *30-31.
73 Id at *26-27 ("[Bacarella] exercised complete discretion over the ... accounts and determined [who] received IPO allocations. He invited [the] trustees and permitted [ ] an existing
director to receive IPOs. He did not disclose these transactions to the remaining members of the
Board.").
74 The AU reasoned that
70

71

Mr. Bacarella possessed all the attributes which indicate that he was aware of the implications of his actions: a high level of formal education in the field of business, over twenty
years experience in the securities industry, success in managing investments, and a reputation for high ethical standards.
Mr. Bacarella's lack of candor and his attempts to hide his actions support [the] finding that he acted with the intent to deceive.
In the Matter of Monetta FinancialServices, Inc, 2000 SEC LEXIS 574, *62-63 (internal citations
omitted).
75 See Monetta, 390 F3d at 956-57 (agreeing "with the SEC that MFS had a duty to disclose
the fact that it allocated IPO shares to the director-clients," and that "[ilts failure to do so constituted fraud or deceit within the meaning of Section 206(2)" even though "[n]o rules expressly
required disclosure of the IPO allocations").
76
Id at 957.
77 Id.
78
Id at 956-57 (citing Howard for the proposition that "the absence of red flags [is significant] in assessing one's liability as an aider and abettor").
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other words, Bacarella's full knowledge of the underlying factswithout knowledge that he was breaking the law-was insufficient to
establish his liability as an aider and abettor, even where, in contrast
to Howard, the primary violation did not require scienter. Like Howard, Monetta fails to acknowledge either the general rule that ignorance of the law is no defense or the authority applying that rule to
SEC administrative actions.
D. Circuit Split
The current state of the law is murky at best. The status of the mistake of law defense in SEC administrative proceedings is critical to the
disciplinary system that regulates the United States's capital markets,
and yet it remains an open question. At the very least there appears to
be a split between the D.C. and Seventh Circuits on one hand and the
Second and Ninth Circuits on the other over whether ignorance of the
law is a defense to administrative aiding and abetting liability."'
III. EVALUATION OF A MISTAKE OF LAW DEFENSE TO
AIDING AND ABETIING LIABILITY

This Part evaluates and rejects the two primary arguments for allowing a mistake of law defense to administrative aiding and abetting
liability. The first argument is based on the fact that the SEC can only
sanction those who "willfully" violate the securities laws, where "willfulness" might require knowledge that one is acting illegally, as discussed in
Part I.B. The second argument is based on a distinction between primary
and secondary liability, and would provide a mistake of law defense
specifically for the latter. Both arguments are advanced only implicitly
in Howard and Monetta, and both are ultimately untenable.
A. Willfulness
One argument that ignorance of the law is a defense to administrative aiding and abetting liability is based on the word "willfully" in
the statutes authorizing administrative punishments.'o The Howard
court hinted at this argument when it asked how "one decide[s]

79 Compare United States v English, 92 F3d 909,914 (9th Cir 1996) and Arthur Lipper, 547
F2d at 180 (holding that ignorance of the law isnot a defense), with Howard,376 F3d at 1142-43
and Monetta,390 F3d at 956-57 (implying that ignorance of the law is a defense).
80 See 15 USC §§ 78o(b)(4)(D) (authorizing suspension and revocation), 78u-2(a)(1) (authorizing monetary penalties).
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whether a person willfully aided and abetted a securities violation."8' It
declined to elaborate on the possible answer, however, before going
on to discuss the "awareness of wrongdoing" requirement.8 Nevertheless, even if implicit, one possible justification for the mistake of law
defense in Howard might be based on the word "willfully," particularly

in light of the fact that other courts have similarly construed the word
in different contexts.
Such a statutory mistake of law defense would have a wide-

ranging impact on the securities laws," and it would conflict with wellestablished precedent. The D.C. Circuit has explicitly rejected a mistake of law defense in the word "willfully" in the context of administrative liability for primary violations. As a result, allowing "willfully"
to create a mistake of law defense to administrative aiding and abet-

ting would require reading the word one way in § 15(b)(4)(E) of the
Exchange Act (aiding and abetting liability) and another way in
§ 15(b)(4)(D) (primary liability)." If the "normal rule of statutory construction [is] that identical words used in different parts of the same
act are intended to have the same meaning,"" it is hard to see how
identical words used in identical contexts in neighboring subsections
of a statute could have such different meanings.
Furthermore, allowing "willfully" to create a mistake of law defense to administrative aiding and abetting liability would also conflict

with the Eighth Circuit's unchallenged interpretation of the Supreme
Court's reasoning in a remanded case involving criminal insider trading-namely, that ignorance of the law is not a defense in criminal
prosecutions for securities fraud." As the Second Circuit observed, it
would be "inconceivable" that the word "willfully" could set a higher

intent standard in administrative actions than in criminal prosecutions
81 See 376 F3d at 1142 (lamenting that the "rules for determining aiding and abetting
[securities violations] are unclear, in an area that demands certainty and predictability") (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
82 See id.
83 A whole host of provisions in the securities laws also employ the term. See, for example,
15 USC §§ 77x; 78u-2(a)(2); 78ff(a). See also Loss and Seligman, Securities Regulation § 8-A-5 n
134 (cited in note 36) ("['Willfully'] appears not only in most of the disciplinary provisions but
also in all the SEC statutes' penal provisions and in a few miscellaneous sections.").
84 See Part II.B, citing Wonsover, 205 F3d at 414; Gearhart& Otis, Inc v SEC, 348 F2d 798,
802-03 (DC Cir 1965).
85 See 15 USC § 78o(b)(4)(D)-(E).
86 Sullivan v Stroop, 496 US 478,484 (1990) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
87 United States v O'Hagan,139 F3d 641, 647 (8th Cir 1998) (holding that because § 32(a)
of the Exchange Act provides that "no person shall be subject to imprisonment under this section
for the violation of any rule or regulation if he proves that he had no knowledge of such rule or
regulation," the statute by negative implication allows a criminal penalty other than imprisonment
even when the defendant did not have such knowledge), on remand from 521 US 642 (1997).
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under the securities laws." Moreover, the Supreme Court decisions
that have based a mistake of law defense on the term "willfully"89
postdate the codification of § 15(b)(4)(E) in 1975,'° which forecloses
the argument that Congress intended to adopt a new meaning of willfulness based on its presumed awareness of those decisions.
B. Primary versus Secondary Liability
The main basis for the mistake of law defense in Howard and
Monetta was a distinction between primary and secondary liability,
which would allow ignorance of the law to serve as a defense specifically to aiding and abetting liability. Such a mistake of law defense, by
being specific to aiding and abetting, avoids the objection that ignorance of the law is not a defense to administrative liability for primary
violations of the securities laws. What this mistake of law defense
lacks, however, is any justification for existing in the first place: it has
no basis in statute, and the precedent on which it relies is both inapplicable and defunct.
1. Howard,Monetta, and their administrative precedent.

The concurring opinion in Howard expressly argues for a distinct
standard of intent for aiding and abetting,9' and the majority opinions
in both Howard and Monetta do so implicitly by framing the intent

to aiders and abettors.9 The line of cases
standard as being particular
they rely on for their aiding and abetting standard leads back to Inves88 See Tager, 344 F2d at 8 ("It is conceivable, therefore, that 'willfully' means something
less in § 15(b) than it does in the penal provisions of the SEC acts. It is inconceivable that it
means something more.") (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
89 See Ratzlaf v United States, 510 US 135,137 (1994) ("[T]he Government must prove that
the defendant acted with knowledge that his conduct was unlawful."). See also Cheek v United
States, 498 US 192, 201 (1991) ("Willfulness ...requires the Government to prove that ... the
defendant knew of [a violated legal] duty.").
90 See Act of June 4,1975, Pub L No 94-29 § 11, 89 Stat 97,123 (1975), codified at 15 USC §
78o(b)(4)(E). See also Nees v SEC,414 F2d 211,220 (9th Cir 1969) ("The relevant statute ... was
15 U.S.C. § 78o(b). This provision was amended after the petitioner's hearing.").
91 376 F3d at 1152 (Henderson concurring) (using a "separate [recklessness] standard applicable to an element of aiding and abetting, but not primary, liability"), citing Investors Research
Corp v SEC, 628 F2d 168, 178 (DC Cir 1980) (adopting a three-part test for aider and abettor
liability: (1) that another party has committed a securities law violation; (2) that the accused
aider and abettor had a general awareness that his role was part of an overall activity that was
improper; and (3) that the accused aider and abettor knowingly and substantially assisted the
principal violation).
92 See Howard, 376 F3d at 1142 (discussing "the awareness of wrong-doing requirement in
aiding and abetting disciplinary cases") (internal quotation marks omitted); Monetta, 390 F3d at
956 ("The SEC will find one liable for aiding and abetting where ...the aider and abettor generally was aware or knew that his or her actions were part of an overall course of conduct that was
improper or illegal.").
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tors Research Corp v SEC,93 a D.C. Circuit opinion allowing ignorance
of the law to serve as a defense" to an administrative action under a
different but almost identically worded provision of the securities
laws.95 In Investors Research, Judge Bazelon explained that "[t]he
awareness of wrong-doing requirement for aiding and abetting liability is designed to insure that innocent, incidental participants in transactions later found to be illegal are not subjected to harsh, [sic] civil,
criminal, or administrative penalties. '' 6
2. Origins of the "awareness of wrong-doing" requirement.
Investors Research, however, was exceptional in administrative
securities law 7 Until Howard, there do not seem to be any published
appellate decisions applying the intent standard from Investors Research to an administrative action." Nor was Investors Research based
on administrative precedent. Although the case concerned an appeal
from an SEC administrative action, the D.C. Circuit's "awareness of
wrong-doing" requirement was based on a whole line of cases involving civil rather than administrative aiding and abetting liability. Unlike
administrative aiding and abetting liability, civil aiding and abetting
liability was not based on any express statutory authority until recently. Accordingly, this "implied right" aiding and abetting liability 93 628 F2d 168 (DC Cir 1980). Monetta follows Howard and SEC v Steadman (Steadman 1),
both of which in turn follow Investors Research. See Monetta,390 F3d at 957, citing Howard,376
F3d at 1142-43, and Steadman 1, 967 F2d 636,647 (DC Cir 1992).
94 See Investors Research, 628 F2d at 178-79 (vacating the SEC's order against the accused
aider and abettor on the grounds that the Commission's inconsistent findings on the respondent's state of mind could not support "a general awareness that he was assisting [ ] in wrongful
conduct"; the Commission found both that the respondent's "belief that the law permitted [the
violators] to engage in these transactions may well have been entertained in good faith" and that
he was "involved in every aspect of the relevant transactions").
95 Compare the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 USC § 80a-9(b) (2000), with the Exchange Act, 15 USC § 78o(b)(4)(E).
96 628 F2d at 177.
97 See generally Part II.B (describing ignorance of law in SEC administrative actions).
98 A Lexis Shepard's report shows that only two other circuit decisions cited the Investors
Research intent standard for aiding and abetting in the context of an appeal from an SEC administrative decision. See Graham v SEC, 222 F3d 994, 1000 (DC Cir 2000); Dirks v SEC, 681 F2d
824, 829, 844 & n 25 (DC Cir 1982). In neither was ignorance of law an issue-the ignorance in
question was always with respect to facts.
99 Aiding and abetting was an implied civil right of action for both the SEC and for private
litigants in every circuit until the Supreme Court eliminated it in 1994. See Central Bank of
Denver v First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 US 164, 192 (1994) (Stevens dissenting) ("[A]II 11
Courts of Appeals to have considered the question have recognized a private action against
aiders and abettors."). The next year, Congress passed the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act of 1995 (PSLRA), Pub L No 104-67, Title I § 104, 109 Stat 737, 757 (1998), codified at 15
USC § 78t (2000), which gave the SEC-although not private litigants-the express authority to
bring civil actions against aiders and abettors of the securities laws. See SEC v Fehn, 97 F3d 1276,
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with the exception of Investors Research itself-developed along an

entirely distinct line of decisions, some of which accepted ignorance of
the law as a defense. They did so, however, in the peculiar context of
applying a judicially created exception to a judicially created right of
action that was later abolished by the Supreme Court.'O'
A Sixth Circuit case, SEC v Coffey,"' originated this line of civil
aiding and abetting decisions. Coffey adopted a test"2 for implied civil
Ruder,
aiding and abetting liability from an article by Professor Davidauthor.
03
'
original
its
after
test"
"Ruder
the
as
to
which will be referred
As formulated by the Sixth Circuit, the intent prong of the Ruder test
requires that the "accused [aider and abettor have] general awareness
that his role was part of an overall activity that is improper,"' leaving
it somewhat unclear whether ignorance of the law is a defense-that
is, whether the "awareness" requirement applies to the word "improper" as well as the word "activity." The Ruder test is what Investors
ultimately relied on,
Research (and therefore Howard and Monetta)
although the civil aiding and abetting decisions applying the test often
left unclear whether ignorance of the law was a valid defense.'"6 The
1282-84 (9th Cir 1996) ("Legislative history confirms that Section 104 was intended to override
Central Bank's apparent elimination of the SEC's power to enjoin the aiding and abetting of
securities law violations.").
100See Central Bank, 511 US at 190-91 ("if we were to rely on this reasoning now, we
would be obliged ...to hold that a civil aiding and abetting cause of action is available for every
provision of the [Exchange] Act. There would be no logical stopping point.").
101493 F2d 1304 (6th Cir 1974).
102 The test is as follows:
[A] person may be held as an aider and abettor only if [1] some other party has committed
a securities law violation, [2] if the accused party had general awareness that his role was
part of an overall activity that is improper, and [3] if the accused aider-abettor knowingly
and substantially assisted the violation.
Id at 1316.
103 Id at 1315 n 23, citing generally David S. Ruder, Multiple Defendants in Securities Law
FraudCases:Aiding andAbetting, Conspiracy,in Pari Delicto, Indemnification,and Contribution,
120 U Pa L Rev 597 (1972). The Supreme Court also cited the Ruder test when expressly reserving the question "whether civil liability for aiding and abetting is appropriate" under "§ 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5." Ernst & Ernst v Hochfelder, 425 US 185, 191-92 n 7 (1976). This history is also
noted in Dirks,681 F2d at 844 n 25.
104 Coffey, 493 F2d at 1316. The particular facts of that case also leave some doubt as to
whether ignorance of the law was necessarily a defense. Both the defendant and the purportedly
defrauded State of Ohio held a mistaken belief regarding the legality of a certain type of security
under Ohio law. The court observed that a state treasurer ought to know state law, stating that
"[w]e cannot describe the Treasurer's failure to fulfill this elementary duty as a fraud practiced
upon it by a securities offeror." Id at 1312 n 17.
105 See Investors Research, 628 F2d at 177 & n 56, citing Coffey, 493 F2d at 1316 n 23.
106 Compare Harmsen v Smith, 693 F2d 932, 943 (9th Cir 1982) (requiring "actual knowledge by the alleged aider and abettor of the wrong and of his or her role in furthering it") and
Woodward v Metro Bank of Dallas,522 F2d 84,97 (5th Cir 1975) (requiring "scienter of the high
'conscious intent' variety" for aiding and abetting liability "when it is impossible to find any duty
of disclosure"), with Anixter v Home-Stake Production Co, 77 F3d 1215, 1225 (10th Cir 1996)
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Ruder test itself is also ambiguous regarding whether ignorance of the

law can serve as a defense: it requires "[k]nowledge of wrongful purpose... [as] a crucial element in aiding and abetting."'ln

Nevertheless, to the extent that a mistake of law defense might
exist in the Ruder test and its civil aiding and abetting case law, such a
defense is specific to aiding and abetting liability. Ruder expressly proposed that aiding and abetting should require an especially high standard of intent in order to protect innocent third parties from liability.'
3. Anachronistic justifications for a heightened intent standard
for aiding and abetting.
The context in which Ruder wrote may be relevant: the law regarding intent for securities fraud was still poorly defined. The intent

standard in most circuits for securities fraud at the time of Coffey was
mere negligence. Subsequently, in 1976, the Supreme Court raised this
standard by holding that the most common form of securities fraud
required scienter, or deceptive intent.w Accordingly, Ruder rested his

proposal for protecting innocent third parties on the particular nature
of aiding and abetting, as opposed to a more general theory regarding
the intent required for securities fraud. "' Moreover, although the

(requiring "knowledge of the primary violation by alleged aider and abettor"); Camp v Dema,
948 F2d 455, 459 (8th Cir 1991) (noting that ignorance of the securities laws does not defeat the
knowledge requirement for implied aiding and abetting liability); Monsen v Consolidated
Dressed Beef Co, 579 F2d 793, 799 (3d Cir 1978) (adopting Woodward's test of aiding and abetting liability, but characterizing the second prong as requiring "that the alleged aider-abettor had
knowledge of [a wrongful] act").
107 Ruder, 120 U Pa L Rev at 631 (cited in note 103).
108

Ruder argued:

If all that is required in order to impose liability for aiding and abetting is that illegal activity under the securities laws exists and that a secondary defendant, such as a bank, gave aid
to that illegal activity, the act of loaning funds to the market manipulator would clearly fall
within that category and would expose the bank to liability for aiding and abetting. Imposition of such liability upon banks would virtually make them insurers regarding the conduct
of insiders to whom they lend money. If it is assumed that an illegal scheme existed and that
the bank's loan or other activity provided assistance to that scheme, some remaining distinguishing factor must be found in order to prevent such automatic liability. The bank's
knowledge of the illegal scheme at the time it loaned the money or agreed to loan the
money provides that additional factor.
Id at 630-31.
109 See Ernst & Ernst,425 US at 191-93 (concluding that one cannot violate § 10(b) of the
Exchange Act without scienter).
110 Ruder expressly noted, but did not attempt to answer, the question of whether securities
fraud required some particular form of deceptive intent:
The existence of a knowledge requirement in order to impose [aiding and abetting] liability
should be distinguished from the question whether scienter is a necessary element to establish liability for the primary participant. The question whether scienter is a required ele-

The University of Chicago Law Review

[74:299

Ruder test first entered into circuit precedent through Coffey, a civil
enforcement action, it was later cited by a number of decisions involving aiding and abetting in the context of private civil actions.' Such
private actions against aiders and abettors had no statutory basis and
were subsequently abolished by the Supreme Court. 2
Thus the best explanation for the courts' special approach to civil
aiding and abetting liability might simply be a historical one. The
courts of appeals had been applying an erroneously low standard of
intent to an invalid private right of action against aiders and abettors.
They then were faced with the task of cabining the sweeping implications of their own mistaken doctrines."' This explanation is further
buttressed by the fact that, until Howard and Monetta, Investors Re-

-searchwas the only decision applying the Ruder test to administrative
aiding and abetting liability. Today, however, the implied civil aiding
and abetting liability that was the subject of the Ruder test no longer
exists, extinguishing whatever vexatious litigation it might have
spawned in the first place.
Subsequent Supreme Court precedent undermines the holding of
Investors Research as well as the authorities on which it relied. First, in
holding that scienter was an element of securities fraud, the Court
made no distinction between primary and secondary liability."' Second, in abolishing the implied civil right of action for aiding and abetting under the Exchange Act, the Supreme Court cautioned the circuits to remember that "[p]olicy considerations cannot override ... the
text and structure of the Act.." As noted in Part III.A, the aiding and
abetting provision at issue in Howard and Monetta is indistinguishable
from the provision authorizing sanctions against primary violators.
Even if there do remain sound policy justifications for the mistake of
law defense that protected the respondents from administrative sancment under rule 10b-5, the primary federal regulation dealing with securities law fraud,
must be regarded as open at this time.
Ruder, 120 U Pa L Rev at 631 (cited in note 103).
111 See, for example, Woodward, 522 F2d at 96-97 (finding Ruder's example "remarkably
similar to the case at hand"); Cleary v Perfectune, Inc, 700 F2d 774, 777 (1st Cir 1983) (suggesting
that the test "to determine whether a defendant is liable as an aider and abettor ...is now wellsettled"); Woods v Barnett Bank of Fort Lauderdale,765 F2d 1004, 1009 (11th Cir 1985), citing
Woodward, 522 F2d at 94-95, as binding precedent for the Eleventh Circuit.
112 See Central Bank,511 US at 190-91. See also note 100 and accompanying text.
113 Consider Central Bank, 511 US at 188-89 (noting the lack of clarity and ad hoc nature of
aiding and abetting decisions, and the corresponding potential for "vexatious[]" litigation).
114 See Ernst & Ernst, 425 US at 193 (making no distinction, in a civil context, between
scienter for aiding and abetting liability and for primary violations).
115 Central Bank, 511 US at 188. See also id at 192 (Stevens dissenting) ("The main themes
of the Court's opinion are that the text of § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 does
not expressly mention aiding and abetting liability, and that Congress knows how to legislate.")
(internal citations omitted).
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tions in Howard, Monetta, and Investors Research, they cannot stand
without some statutory justification.
In any event, it is doubtful that such policy considerations exist.
An implied private right of action presents a very different set of policy
concerns than a statutorily based administrative right of action. In addition to the fact that only one is clearly authorized by law, a private right
of action allows suits to be brought by any plaintiff against any defendant. An administrative action, by contrast, can only be brought by the
SEC, typically against a securities professional. The narrow class of
potential respondents mitigates the need for the mistake of law defense-one primary justification for the defense is that it protects people from technical statutes whose reach is so broad that most affected
individuals cannot reasonably be expected to know their legal duties. " '
It is therefore somewhat perverse that, because of the demise of
the private right of action against aiders and abettors, the only area of
the law in which the Ruder test remains applicable is in administrative
actions for aiding and abetting. A mistake of law defense specific to
such actions is very much out of place: it has no policy justification, no
statutory justification, and the authority it relies on is now defunct. If
either Howard or Monetta was correct in allowing ignorance of the
law to be a defense, there must be a better justification than actually
appears in the opinions themselves.
IV. SCIENTER AS THE ALTERNATIVE

This Part proposes an alternative basis for a mistake of law defense in administrative actions, though one that applies equally to
primary and secondary violators. Borrowing from the previous discussion regarding ignorance of the law generally, this Part argues that
ignorance of the law is a valid defense when, and only when, it negates
an intent element of the violation. In the context of the securities laws,
this means that ignorance of the law will only be a defense when it
negates the scienter, or deceptive intent, required for securities fraud.
A.

Scienter as Distinct from a Separate Intent Requirement
for Aiding and Abetting

However shaky the legal underpinnings of Howard and Monetta,
the two holdings constitute the law of the D.C. and Seventh Circuits.
Moreover, other courts might view Howard and Monetta as persuasive
116 See Murphy and O'Hara, 5 S Ct Econ Rev 217, 259-60 (cited in note 21) (discussing the
mistake of law defense allowed for violations of criminal tax provisions, because tax regulations
"are complex in order to channel behavior precisely, yet [ ] touch on the behavior of very large
portions of the population as a whole, rather than being limited in scope to particular industries").
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because they are rooted in decades of securities law jurisprudence
regarding private civil actions, even if those actions no longer exist.
Given the weakness of the stated arguments for a mistake of law
defense, it may be worthwhile to examine alternative justifications for
the defense. Since the body of precedent on which Howard and Monetta rely is almost entirely composed of civil actions, such a justification should explain how courts have evaluated the culpability of aiders and abettors in practice, both in administrative and civil contexts.
Most importantly, a good justification will be one that is well founded
in securities jurisprudence generally and does not rely on any distinct
property of aiding and abetting liability.
Such a justification was actually articulated, though rejected, by
Ruder himself. As noted above, Ruder explicitly distinguished the "existence of a knowledge requirement in order to impose [aiding and
abetting] liability ... from the question whether scienter is a necessary

element to establish liability for the primary participant.". 7 Although
at the time Ruder wrote that "[t]he question whether scienter [was] a
required element under rule 10b-5, the primary federal regulation
dealing with securities law fraud, [was] regarded as open,''18 that question is now closed-scienter is required. "9 The Supreme Court has interpreted scienter in the context of the securities laws as "a mental state
embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud."' 0The Court has
held that scienter is an independent and necessary element of a securities fraud, regardless of whether a particular action is brought by a
private party 1 or by the SEC as a civil"2 or administrative" enforcement action. By contrast, the existence of an implied private right of
action for aiding and abetting, widely accepted at the time Ruder
wrote,"' no longer exists. This shift in the law suggests that Ruder was
wrong to found his test-and its mistake of law defense-on the particular nature of aiding and abetting liability.
117

Ruder, 120 U Pa L Rev at 631 (cited in note 103).

118

Id.

119 See Ernst & Ernst v Hochfelder, 425 US 185, 191-93 (1976) (concluding that a private
cause of action for damages will not lie without intent to deceive).
120 Aaron v SEC, 446 US 680, 686 n 5 (1980), citing Ernst & Ernst, 425 US at 193-94 n 12.
The Aaron Court, "[i]n determining whether proof of scienter is a necessary element of a violation of § 17(a)" of the Securities Act, reasoned that "[t]he language of § 17 (a)(1), which makes it
unlawful 'to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,' plainly evinces an intent on the
part of Congress to proscribe only knowing or intentional misconduct." 446 US at 695-96.
121 See, for example, Basic Inc v Levinson, 485 US 224,231 (1988).
122 See, for example, Aaron, 446 US at 697.
123 See, for example, Dirks v SEC, 463 US 646,663 n 23 (1983).
124 See Central Bank of Denver v First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 US 164, 192 (1994)
(Stevens dissenting) (noting that an implied private right of action for aiding and abetting had
existed in every circuit that had considered the question).
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Unlike the arguable mistake of law defense based on the "willfulness" requirement of § 15(b)(4) of the Exchange Act, scienter requirements are based on the underlying provision being violated
rather than on the manner of its violation.' Given that scienter is now
a necessary element for all securities fraud, both primary and secondary, Ruder's bank example above ' makes a strong policy case for
what is already a well-accepted proposition in criminal law: that the
intent required for a secondary violation must match the intent required for the primary violation. 7
In the case of the securities laws, such an equivalence would simply mean that scienter is required for aiders and abettors whenever it
is required for primary violators. Thus the innocent bank in Ruder's
above hypothetical would not be liable for the same reason Ruder
advanced: because it had no "knowledge of the illegal scheme" that it
was facilitating.25 Only the legal basis for the rule would be different.
There is no need to invent a mistake of the law defense unique to aiding and abetting when there is a much more plausible one to be found
in the doctrine of scienter, which would encompass aiding and abetting anyway."'
Although these two approaches yield the same result in Ruder's
bank hypothetical, they will yield different results in a significant
number of cases. Ruder's mistake of law defense is specific to the type
of legal liability (aiding and abetting). It would therefore apply to all
aiding and abetting of securities law violations, from the egregiously
fraudulent to the merely technical, but not to any primary violations.12°
By contrast, a mistake of law defense rooted in scienter would be specific to the type of underlying violation (namely, fraud), and would
apply to primary as well as secondary violations. Thus the Ruder test
would give a mistake of law defense to the aider and abettor of a
technical violation, while the scienter-based approach would not; the
125 For instance, a person who acts without scienter does not violate some provisions of the
securities laws at all-and therefore cannot violate them willfully, as required for administrative
enforcement actions under § 15(b). See, for example, Aaron, 446 US at 697.

126

See note 108.

127 Compare MPC § 2.06(4) (requiring the same mens rea for accomplice liability as for the

primary violation when "causing a particular result is an element of an offense"); Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 877(a) (1979) (allowing an actor to be held liable for conduct where he "orders or induces the conduct, if he knows or should know of circumstances that would make the
conduct tortious if it were his own").
128 Ruder, 120 U Pa L Rev at 631 (cited in note 103).
129 See, for example, Ernst & Ernst, 425 US at 191-93 & n 7 (requiring scienter for aiding
and abetting a violation of § 10(b) of the Exchange Act).
130 See, for example, SEC v Steadman (Steadman 1), 967 F2d 636,647 (DC Cir 1992) (holding that ignorance of the law was a defense to aiding and abetting even when some of the primary violations required scienter and some did not).
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scienter-based approach would give a mistake of law defense to a primary violator who acted without fraudulent intent, while the Ruder
test would not. One approach focuses on the violator; the other focuses on the violation.
This distinction is almost never made explicit. Some courts conflate the Ruder test's "general awareness" requirement for aiding and
abetting liability with the scienter requirement for all antifraud liability."' Other courts have implicitly kept the two separate, applying the
Ruder test to create a mistake of law defense even where the primary
violation did not require scienter. ", In none of these decisions did the
courts explain precisely what they were doing or how scienter might
relate to the "general awareness" test for aiding and abetting liability.
In fact, it appears that no published article or decision has ever
sketched out the contours of an ignorance of the law defense based on
the Supreme Court's scienter jurisprudence. " '
B. Ignorance of the Law as a Defense Rooted in Scienter
This section lays out an alternate rule under which ignorance of
the law can sometimes serve as a defense to SEC administrative actions. This rule is based on the Supreme Court's scienter jurisprudence
rather than defunct aiding and abetting case law, and draws on both
the MPC and Supreme Court precedent regarding ignorance of the
law generally. Consistent with the general rule that ignorance of the
law is no defense, this section argues that ignorance of the law is only
a defense when it negates the scienter required for a particular violation of the securities laws. It also argues that this rule describes how
the courts of appeals have decided cases in practice.
1. Scienter and mistakes of law.
If, as discussed in Part III.A, ignorance of the law is not a defense
created by the word "willfully," and is also not somehow specific to the
nature of administrative aiding and abetting violations, there remains
the question of when or whether it is a defense. The MPC, as discussed
in Part I.B, allows for two exceptions to the rule that ignorance of the
law is no defense. One is when the statute expressly provides for such a

See, for example, Dirks,681 F2d at 844 (labeling a section as "Aiding or Abetting Scienter").
See, for example, Steadman I, 967 F2d at 647 (holding that Steadman was not shown to
have been "generally aware" of the primary violations).
133 As noted earlier, Ruder himself did make such a distinction, though he did so prior to
the Supreme Court's adoption of scienter as an element of securities fraud. See Ruder, 120 U Pa
L Rev at 631 (cited in note 103).
131
132
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defense.', The other exception relates to the scope of the rule that ignorance of the law is not a defense, allowing the defense when ignorance of the law negates a necessary intent element. '3' Applying this
second exception to administrative violations of the securities laws,
ignorance of the law should be a defense when it negates the scienter
required for a violation of a particular provision of the securities laws.
When scienter is not required, or when it is satisfied by some other
deception that was unrelated to the contents of the law, ignorance of
the law would not be a defense.
The Supreme Court's definition of scienter requires deceptive, manipulative, or fraudulent intent."6 Deception37 in the form of an omission, however, is only a violation of the securities laws where there is
some sort of legal duty to disclose 38 and where the omission is material. "9 Furthermore, as a general rule, a violation of the law that occurred as part of a relevant transaction is a material fact that must be
disclosed' Thus in some circumstances scienter might require knowledge that some aspect of a transaction was illegal, since otherwise the
actor would not know the fact that her omission was material."'

134 For example, as discussed in Part III.A, the courts have sometimes held that a statutory
requirement of "willfulness" creates a mistake of law defense.
135 See MPC § 2.04(1) ("Ignorance or mistake as to a matter of... law is a defense if: [ the
ignorance or mistake negatives the purpose, knowledge, belief, recklessness or negligence required to establish a material element of the offense."); MPC and Commentaries § 2.02 at 250
(ALI 1985) ("Claim of right is a defense [to theft] because the property must belong to someone
else for the theft to occur and the defendant must have culpable awareness of that fact.").
136 See Aaron, 446 US at 686 n 5.
137 For convenience, this term will be employed broadly to include manipulation and fraud

as well.
See Chiarellav United States, 445 US 222,232 (1980).
See Basic Inc, 485 US at 240 ("[M]ateriality depends on the significance the reasonable
investor would place on the withheld or misrepresented information.").
140 See, for example, In the Matter of Howard, 2003 SEC LEXIS 377, *20 (holding that
because the respondent violated Rule 10b-9 by failing to disclose that "the required minimum
for the first offering could not be sold to investors, a fact that would clearly have been material
to customers determining whether or not to invest in the second offering," he also violated Rule
10b-5). See also Steadman I, 967 F2d at 645 (affirming that where a firm's "failure to register
under state Blue Sky laws subjected [it] to large potential liabilities," disclosure of the general
nature of the potential liability was required). But consider Oran v Stafford, 226 F3d 275,288 (3d
Cir 2000) ("[D]emonstration of a violation of the disclosure requirements... does not lead
inevitably to the conclusion that such disclosure would be required under Rule 10b-5."); Gaines
v Haughton, 645 F2d 761,776 (9th Cir 1981) (drawing "a sharp distinction" between allegations
of nondisclosure of matters which are presumptively material and "allegations of simple breach
of fiduciary duty/waste of corporate assets-the nondisclosure of which is never material for
§ 14(a) purposes").
141 Consider Morissette v United States, 342 US 246,271 (1952) (overturning a conviction for
conversion of government property, because it was "not apparent how [the defendant] could
have knowingly or intentionally converted property that he did not know could be converted, as
would be the case it was in fact abandoned or if he truly believed it to be abandoned").
138
139
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Illegality, however, is only one type of materiality; an omitted fact
may be material for reasons unrelated to the requirements of the law.
Howard provides a good illustration of this principle. Howard helped
his firm market a "part-or-none offering" -an offering in which investors make their purchase subject to the condition that the offeror will
sell a minimum total number of shares at the same price. " A given
investor with whom Howard dealt was likely "comforted by the
knowledge that unless his judgment to take the risk [was] shared by
enough others to sell out the issue, his money [would] be returned.' ' 3
A rational investor would therefore probably consider it significant
that his assessment of the offering's value was not so widely shared by
the market as to put the offering past the amount required to close.
Accordingly, Howard could have had deceptive intent if he realized
that investors would attach significance to the fact that the offering'"
only closed because his firm purchased the necessary additional
shares.14' Alternatively, Howard could have had deceptive intent if he
realized that this ploy violated Rule 10b-9 even if he did not realize
that investors would care whether his firm purchased part of the offering that it was marketing. Howard lacked scienter only if he was both
ignorant of the fact that investors would care about his firm's purchases and ignorant of the fact that those purchases were illegal. Thus
illegality is sufficient but not necessary to make an omission deceptive,
and so ignorance of the law may sometimes-but not necessarilynegate scienter.
In other words, even if there is no freestanding or complete mistake of law defense, there may be circumstances in which a key fact
somehow involves the law. Under those circumstances ignorance of the
law may excuse, at least with respect to that fact. The Supreme Court
expressly made this distinction in a case involving food stamp fraud:
The dissent repeatedly claims that our holding today creates a
defense of "mistake of law." Our holding today no more creates a
"mistake of law" defense than does a statute making knowing receipt of stolen goods unlawful. In both cases, there is a legal element in the definition of the offense. In the case of a receipt-of142

See Part II.C (discussing Howardgenerally).

SEC v Blinder,Robinson & Co, 542 F Supp 468,476 (D Colo 1982) (discussing investor
confidence in the context of an "all or none" offering, a similar device in which all shares must be
sold, rather than a certain minimum number of shares).
144 There were actually two offerings, and the SEC also found Howard liable for not disclosing to purchasers of the second offering the fact that the first offering had closed improperly. See
Howard,376 F3d at 1141. This illustration refers to the first offering as "the offering" for the sake
of simplicity.
145 No such finding was actually made by the SEC, but it appears to have been assumed. See
generally In the Matter of Howard,2003 SEC LEXIS 377.
143
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stolen-goods statute, the legal element is that the goods were stolen; in this case, the legal element is that the "use, transfer, acquisition," etc. were in a manner not authorized by statute or regulations. It is not a defense to a charge of receipt of stolen goods
that one did not know that such receipt was illegal, and it is not a
defense to a charge of [food stamp fraud] that one did not know
that possessing food stamps in a manner unauthorized by statute
or regulations was illegal. It is, however, a defense to a charge of
knowing receipt of stolen goods that one did not know that the
goods were stolen, just as it is a defense to a charge of [food
stamp fraud] that one did not know that one's possession was
unauthorized. '
In other words, ignorance of the law can be a defense when it negates an element of the violation. Thus in the securities laws, when
scienter is an element of the violation, ignorance of the law should be
a defense when it negates deceptive intent, and should not be a defense when it does not.
2. Consistency with the case law.
The Second and D.C. Circuits have defined scienter in a manner
consistent with the above interpretation: they require an intent to deceive, but not necessarily knowledge of illegality. ' Furthermore, the
vast majority of the actual holdings of the cases discussed in this
Comment are similarly consistent with the theory that ignorance of
the law is a defense when it negates the scienter required for a securities violation. With the notable exceptions of Investors Research and
Monetta,'' this understanding of scienter is consistent with all of the
other decisions discussed in this Comment, both administrative and
civil" 9 as well as primary and secondary."

146 Liparotav United States, 471 US 419,425-26 n 9 (1985) (citations omitted).
147 See Arthur Lipper Corp v SEC, 547 F2d 171, 180 (2d Cir 1976) (conflating willfulness

with scienter and holding that neither requires "knowledge that the law was being violated").
See also SEC v FalstaffBrewing Corp, 629 F2d 62,77 (DC Cir 1980) ("Knowledge means awareness of the underlying facts, not the labels that the law places on those facts. Except in very rare
instances, no area of the law-not even the criminal law-demands that a defendant have
thought his actions were illegal."). See generally Loss and Seligman, SecuritiesRegulation § 9-B-6
(cited in note 36).
148 Howard, in fact, may arguably be consistent with the scienter-based mistake of law
defense, as discussed below.
149 Scienter is a property of the underlying violation and not the type of legal action, as
noted in Part W.A.
150 See Aaron, 446 US at 696 (making no distinction, in a civil action, between scienter for
aiding and abetting liability and for primary violations); Ernst & Ernst,425 US at 193 (same).
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a) Consistent decisions. With few exceptions, ignorance of the

law was not a defense when there was no scienter requirement for the
underlying violation. A number of older administrative decisions involving antifraud provisions rejected ignorance of the law as a defense."' While these antifraud provisions currently require scienter as
a defense,'52 they did not at the time the cases were decided, so those
opinions are still consistent with a mistake of law defense derived
from the requirement of scienter. Another decision rejected the defense when the underlying provisions that were violated did not require scienter and where the only reason that ignorance of the law was
an issue was that the respondent unsuccessfully claimed it as a defense
based on the willfulness requirement for administrative liability.'3
Furthermore, in those cases where a scienter requirement was fulfilled by some deceptive conduct unrelated to the deceiver's knowl-

edge of the law, ignorance of the law was still not a defense. Two of
these decisions expressly followed the Supreme Court's scienter
precedent and distinguished scienter from knowledge of illegality by
finding the violators' conduct to be deceptive without respect to their
ignorance or knowledge of the law."' A number of other cases fol-

lowed suit, rejecting ignorance of the law as a defense when an aider
and abettor already had intent with respect to some fact that made his
conduct deceptive."
151 See, for example, Tager, 344 F2d at 8 ("[A]ctual knowledge is not necessary for finding
criminal liability."); Gearhart & Otis, Inc v SEC, 348 F2d 798, 802 (DC Cir 1965) (rejecting the
argument "that specific intent to violate the law is an essential element of the willfulness required to violate Section 15(b)").
152 See 15 USC § 78o(b) (codifying § 10(b) of the Exchange Act); 15 USC § 77q(a) (2000)
(codifying § 17(a) of the Securities Act).
153 See Wonsover, 205 F3d at 414 (holding that the defendant only needs to know what he is
doing, not that he is breaking the law).
154 See Arthur Lipper, 547 F2d at 181 (holding that "there must be proof of intention 'to
deceive, manipulate, or defraud'-not an intention to do this in knowing violation of the law").
See also Falstaff,629 F2d at 77 ("Kalmanovitz contends that scienter requires an inquiry into the
defendant's state of mind-his subjective belief as to the legality of his action ....
We strongly
disagree.") (omission in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
155 In Graham v SEC, 222 F3d 994 (DC Cir 2000), the aider and abettor was liable for recklessly facilitating the primary violator's "wash trades," which gave the false appearance of market
activity and thus defrauded other broker-dealers who dealt with him. See id at 1004. In SEC v
Fehn, 97 F3d 1276 (9th Cir 1996), the aider and abettor helped prepare and mail a number of
required filings that he knew to contain false information, see id at 1281, thus acting with the
deceptive intent necessary for scienter, whether or not he knew of the illegality of his actions. See
id at 1295. In United States v O'Hagan,139 F3d 641 (8th Cir 1998), on remand from 521 US 642
(1997), the defendant "was convicted under the misappropriation theory [of insider trading],
which requires the government to prove that he obtained information that was material and
nonpublic, that he used this information to trade securities, and that he breached a duty owed to
the source of the information." 139 F3d at 647-48 (internal quotation marks omitted). Misappropriators "deal in deception" by pretending "loyalty to the principal while secretly converting the
principal's information for personal gain." 521 US at 653.
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By contrast, in those cases where there was a scienter requirement, and where deceptive intent depended on knowledge of illegality,
ignorance of the law was a defense. In these cases ignorance of the law
negated the requisite scienter because without knowledge of illegality
there was no deception. One case from the D.C. Circuit provides a
good example. ' There the court held in a civil action that a group of
mutual funds did not act with sufficient scienter when they failed to
disclose that they were in violation of multiple state laws as a result of
being unregistered in those states. The funds did disclose the fact that
they were unregistered.'1" But since the funds' managers did not realize that this lack of registration was illegal, they understandably failed
to disclose to investors the fact that it was illegal, and so they also
failed to disclose the registration costs and fines they might have to
pay once they were caught.' 8 Because the record suggested that the
funds (via their managers) had no intent to deceive, the court held
that the funds were only liable for the violations that did not require
scienter. "9 In a similar case, the Sixth Circuit held that a defendant was
not liable for offering illegal securities that he thought were legal
when he disclosed the underlying attributes of the securities that
made them illegal. Moreover, all of the implied-right aiding and
abetting cases discussed in Part III.B.2 (as well as the bank hypothetical that Ruder offered to support his test) focused at least obliquely

Steadman 1, 967 F2d 636.
Id at 639.
158 The court concluded that "the [defendants] were not aware that they were required to
register their shares under state ... laws, because their attorney, in a formal, unqualified opinion
letter, told them they did not have to.... [Additionally, t]here [was] no evidence that the [defendants] acted in bad faith." Id at 642.
159 See id at 647:
Both parties agree that the claims of willful or reckless securities fraud were at the core of
the SEC's case. The negligent fraud charges and the alleged pricing and disclosure violations were next in order of seriousness.... We have set aside the findings of violation in the
most serious category, and ...have affirmed the district court on this second category based
only on the presumably negligent omission of a footnote in appellants' financial statements.
156
157

Consider also Steadman v SEC (Steadman I/), 603 F2d 1126 (5th Cir 1979). Here, in a totally
separate case from the D.C. Circuit's Steadman I opinion, and in the context of an appeal from
an SEC administrative action, the Fifth Circuit remanded the SEC's findings of scienter violations, affirmed the findings of nonscienter violations, and cited Tager and Arthur Lipper to reject
a reliance-on-counsel defense based on the word "willfully." See Steadman 11, 603 F2d at 1135
("That the arrangement was approved by the funds' directors and on the advice of counsel does
not render the violation any less willful, for 'willful' in this context simply means that the act
constituting the violation was done intentionally.").
160 See SEC v Coffey, 493 F2d 1304, 1312 (6th Cir 1974) (assuming that an investment in
two-year notes was illegal in the state of Ohio, but concluding that "it is not fraudulent to offer a
two-year note so long as it is represented as such").
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on the issue of scienter, without reference to ignorance of the law as
a distinct issue.16
Finally, according to this scienter-based understanding of the
mistake of law defense, Howard might have reached the correct result,
regardless of its reasoning. As discussed above, Howard should have
been held liable for aiding and abetting securities fraud if the SEC
proved that he either (1) knew the offering violated Rule 10b-9, or (2)
realized that a rational investor would find it material that his firm
had to purchase shares itself in order to save the offering.' 6 The D.C.
Circuit held that Howard was ignorant of the law (that is, Rule 10b-9),
so the key remaining question would, under this approach, be whether
Howard knew that his deception was material to investors.'m Common
sense notwithstanding, the SEC did not appear to make such a finding,'6M and so the holding (if not the reasoning'66) of Howard is arguably
consistent with the argument that ignorance of the law is only a defense where it negates the requisite scienter.
Either way, taken as a whole, the case law reveals a pattern it fails
to recognize: ignorance of the law is a defense when the sole omitted
material fact relates to the contents of the law. Ignorance of the law is
only a defense when it negates an element of the offense67 - in the
case of securities fraud, deceptive intent or scienter.

161 Some of these decisions focus on deception and fraud generally; a number of them predate
the Supreme Court's 1976 articulation of scienter in Ernst & Ernst, 425 US at 193-94 & n 12.
162 For example, in Woodward v Metro Bank of Dallas,522 F2d 84 (5th Cir 1975), the court
held that the defendant bank was not liable for aiding and abetting securities fraud when it
processed a customer's transactions in the ordinary course of business without any evidence of
fraudulent intent. See id at 95. ("[An aider and abettor] must not only be aware of his role, but
he should also know when and to what degree he is furthering the fraud."). In Cleary v Perfectune, Inc, 700 F2d 774 (1st Cir 1983), the court granted summary judgment in favor of an alleged
aider and abettor in the absence of any information suggesting fraudulent or deceptive intent.
See id at 778 (holding that there was "[inisufficient evidence to raise as a genuine question
whether the defendants consciously intended to further [the] allegedly fraudulent scheme").
Conversely, in Woods v Barnett Bank of Fort Lauderdale,765 F2d 1004 (11th Cir 1985), the defendant was held liable for being reckless with respect to the truthfulness of information contained in a letter to a bank that unwittingly assisted in the fraudulent scheme. See id at 1012
("[The defendant's employee] was under a duty to speak truthfully, or stated alternatively, a duty
not to communicate something that he knew to be incorrect, or something for which he had little
or no basis for belief").

163

See Part IV.B.1.

164 See Basic Inc,485 US at 240 ("[M]ateriality depends on the significance the reasonable

investor would place on the withheld or misrepresented information.").
165 See generally Howard,2003 SEC LEXIS 377.
166

See Part II.C.

Consider Liparota,471 US at 425 & n 9 (requiring, "absent indication of contrary purpose in the language or legislative history," mens rea as to all elements in the statutory definition
of a criminal offense).
167
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b) Inconsistent decisions. Investors Research and Monetta ap-

pear to be the only decisions that cannot be reconciled with the notion'
61
that ignorance of the law is only a defense where it negates scienter.
In both cases the courts held that an aider and abettor was not liable
due to his ignorance of the law, despite the fact that in neither case did
the underlying violation actually require scienter.l6
Neither can the mistake of law defense in these decisions be explained by the requirement of "willfulness." As discussed in Part III.A,
such an interpretation would squarely contradict decades of precedent
regarding administrative liability under the securities laws (including
precedent from the D.C. Circuit, which further forecloses this reading
of Investors Research). Instead, as discussed in Part III.B.3, the two
cases should be read as importing a mistake of law defense from nowdefunct private civil actions for aiding and abetting and applying it to
administrative aiding and abetting liability without any statutory justification and despite the general rule that ignorance of the law does
not excuse. Investors Research and Monetta are not well founded and

should be overturned.
V. CONCLUSION

Except for Investors Research and Monetta, securities law prece-

dent is consistent with the idea that ignorance of the law is only a defense where it negates the scienter required for a particular violation.
This limited mistake of law defense is also consistent with the Supreme Court's formulations of scienter and the mistake of law defense. When some alleged deception is based on an omission that involves the contents of the law, ignorance of the law will negate deceptive intent-just as ignorance of the law regarding the ownership of
property negates theft when it leads one to wrongly believe that some
piece of property is his. ° Moreover, this scienter-based understanding
of the mistake of law defense does not rely on the term "willfully," and
thus does not require that "willfully" create a mistake of law defense
in one subsection of the Exchange Act but not in its neighbor, or for
168 This scienter-based mistake of law defense also conflicts with the reasoning in Steadman
1,967 F2d at 647 (holding that ignorance of the law was a defense to aiding and abetting, even
when some of the primary violations required scienter and some did not). However, since the
aiding and abetting causes of action in Steadman I were based on the implied-right theory that
the Supreme Court abolished two years later, the judgment of the court-holding the aider and
abettor not liable-was correct.
169 See Parts II.C and III.B.
170 See Morissette v United States, 342 US 246, 247 (1952) (holding that a mistake regarding
the ownership of property is a defense to theft). See also Liparota v United States, 471 US 419,
425 n 9 (1985) (holding that a mistake regarding the authorization of food stamp possession is a
defense to food stamp fraud).
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administrative but not for criminal violations of the securities laws.
Nor does this version of the mistake of law defense rely on defunct
precedent that sought to cabin judicially created aiding and abetting
liability before the Supreme Court elevated the concept of scienter to
such prominence in the securities laws. Finally, this approach maintains the traditional distinction between ignorance of facts and ignorance of the law.
The distinction is not trivial. For the legal system, it means the difference between the ad hoc application of a legally insupportable theory regarding the special nature of aiding and abetting versus a sensible application of well-accepted precedent regarding scienter. The
distinction also matters in practice. If ignorance of the law is an exception specifically to aiding and abetting, then officers of primary broker-dealer and investment advisor firms will have far less to fear so
long as they remain ignorant of the law-even if they purposefully
deceive investors. Conversely, if ignorance of the law is never an excuse, then the same officers can be severely sanctioned for "fraud,"
even if they did not intend to deceive anyone. Both outcomes seem
intuitively unfair, and both are at odds with the relevant Supreme
Court precedent. Deceit is necessary and sufficient for the fraud, just
as intent to take something belonging to someone else is necessary
and sufficient for theft.
It is true that, in practice, most courts have only allowed ignorance
of the law as a defense where it negates scienter. Expressly announcing
this rule, however, would go a long way toward reducing the confusion
the D.C. Circuit complained about in Howard,7 ' and clarifying a sensitive area of the law that "demands certainty and predictability.' ' 2

171
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See Howard,376 F3d at 1138 (calling the SEC opinion "confused and confusing").
Central Bank of Denver v FirstInterstate Bank of Denver, 511 US 164,188 (1994).

